

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 287128  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 287128

NODIS

CHEROKEE EYES ONLY FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FOL RPT JIDDA 8150 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 01 DEC 77

QUOTE: S E C R E T JIDDA 8150

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG, IS, SA

SUBJECT: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON SADAT INITIATIVE INCLUDING SP-  
ECULATIONS ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF A SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-  
ISRAELI PEACE

REF: STATE 282733

1. WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GATHER A CONSENSUS OF INFORMED  
OBSERVERS' VIEWS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF THE SADAT  
INITIATIVES INCLUDING THE CAIRO CONFERENCE. IN THIS CONNECTION,  
IN THE LAST THREE DAYS WE HAVE TALKED INFORMALLY WITH  
NUMBEROUS SAUDI OFFICIALS AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC  
CORPS. THESE CONTACTS HAVE INCLUDED EXTENSIVE PRIVATE  
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DISCUSSIONS WITH GHAZI AL-GOSAIBI, MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND  
ELECTRICITY, ABD AL-AZIZ QURAISHI, GOVERNOR OF SAMA,  
SULAYMAN AL-SULAYM, MINISTER OF COMMERCE, AND LESS EXTENSIVE  
TALKS WITH MOHAMMED ABA AL-KHAYL, MINISTER OF FINANCE.  
DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS HAVE INCLUDED THE  
AMBASSADORS OF FRNACE, U.K., ITALY, SWITZERLAND, CANADA  
AND DENMARK.

2. THERE IS A GROWING CONCERN, WHICH IS VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS, THAT A SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR CONCESSION ON BEGIN'S PART TOWARD THE OVERALL ARAB POSITION. BECAUSE OF THIS GROWING CONCERN AND THE POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION, WE SUBMIT THESE IMPRESSIONS IF SUCH WERE TO HAPPEN.

A. SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE FROM THE ISRAELI VIEWPOINT BECAUSE IT WOULD NEUTRALIZE THE FOREMOST ARAB MILITARY POWER AND, IN EFFECT, INSURE THE CONTINUING ISRAELI MILITARY DOMINANCE OF CONTIGUOUS TERRITORIES.

B. ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE, IT WOULD HAVE THE IMMEDIATE RESULT OF GIVING THEM PEACE AFTER NEARLY THREE DECADES OF TENSION AND WAR. NO DOUBT THE OCCUPIED EGYPTIAN TERRITORIES WOULD BE RETURNED IN A BILATERAL PEACE TREATY. THE INCREASED COMMERCE PLUS ADDITIONAL AID WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A DEFINITE PLUS, OFFSET TO SOME UNDETERMINED DEGREE BY THE DIMINUTION OF SAUDI SUPPORT BECAUSE OF THEIR UNHAPPINESS ABOUT A SEPARATE PEACE TREATY.

3. IT IS THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF ALL OBSERVERS LISTED ABOVE, CONCURRED IN BY THIS EMBASSY, THAT A SEPARATE  
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PEACE WOULD NOT BE IN THE LONG TERM INTEREST OF THE AREA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. IT WOULD GUARANTEE A MAXIMUM POLARIZATION BETWEEN THE REJECTIONISTS AND MODERATES, WHICH HAS ALREADY RECEIVED FRESH FUEL FROM SADAT'S ACTIVITY TO DATE.

B. WITHOUT SOME SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, WHICH COULD NOT BE HAD IN AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BILATERAL TREATY THERE CAN BE NO PERMANENT OR LASTING PEACE. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN TRUCES FOLLOWING PAST MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE PALESTINIAN HOME- LAND ISSUE IS NOW AN EMOTIONAL CAUSE CENTRAL IN THE MODERATE AS WELL AS THE RADICAL ARAB WORLD. WITHOUT ITS BEING SOLVED OR SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFUSED, THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE.

C. WITH POLARIZATION BETWEEN REJECTIONISTS AND MODERATES, SAUDI ARABIA WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO PURSUE POLICY OF CONSENSUS WITH REGARD TO ARAB QUESTIONS. IT WILL FIND ITSELF TORN BETWEEN THE TWO CAMPS AND THIS WILL BE REFLECTED IN ITS OWN INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS. GIVEN THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE U.S. WILL BE VIEWED AS HAVING BROKERED THE SEPARATE PEACE, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF

NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR SAUDISTO CONTINUE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. ANOTHER NEGATIVE FROM SUCH A SITUATION WOULD BE THAT WE COULD NO LONGER EXPECT FROM THEM BOLD INITIATIVES SUCH AS LEADERSHIP IN MAINTAINING OIL PRICE FREEZES OR INCREASING PRODUCTION TO MEET ENERGY NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN WORLD.

4. WE FEEL IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES NOT BE PLACED IN THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF SEEMING TO ENCOURAGE OR APPROVE A SEPARATE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN PEACE SETTLEMENT AND ATTENDANCE AT THE CAIRO CONFERENCE SHOULD BE WITH THAT CONSTRAINT UPPERMOST.

5. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, IF SADAT'S INITIATIVES LEAD TO  
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A GENERAL MID-EAST SETTLEMENT INVOLVING ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, JORDAN AND EGYPT, BUT LEAVING OUT SYRIA, LEBANON AND THE PLO AS PRESENTLY ORGANIZED, THEN IT COULD PROBABLY BE SOLD TO THE SAUDIS. SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE AS A MINIMUM THE CREATION OF SOME SORT OF PALESTINIAN ENTITY THAT WOULD SERVE AS A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND. IT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO INCLUDE ARAB ROLE IN EAST JERUSALEM WHILE SAUDIS HAVE NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH SADAT'S PERCEPTIBLE PROGRESS TOWARD GENERAL SETTLEMENT, ALL WILL BE FORGIVEN. AS FOR U.S., SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WILL REMAIN INTACT, ALTHOUGH THERE WILL BE QUESTIONING OF IT DURING NEGOTIATION PERIOD.

6. IF U.S. DECIDES TO ATTEND CAIRO CONFERENCE, IT SHOULD BE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE IS TO GENERATE PROGRESS TOWARD A GENERAL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, RATHER THAN A SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE.

7. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS TO CAIRO, AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND TEL AVIV. WEST UNQUOTE VANCE

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